The case for FairShares by Ridley-Duff, Rory & FairShares Association
The case for FairShares
RIDLEY-DUFF, Rory
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/8855/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
RIDLEY-DUFF, Rory (2014). The case for FairShares. Other. Sheffield, FairShares 
Association. 
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
 The Case for a  
FairShares Model 
of Enterprise 
 
 
By Rory Ridley-Duff 
 
  
   Rory Ridley-Duff and FairShares Association, 2014, Creative Commons 4.0 
Published by the FairShares Association, 4 Rosehill Close, Penistone, Sheffield, S36 6UF 
The Case for a FairShares Model of Enterprise 
In this article, co-founder Rory Ridley-Duff outlines the continuing case for social 
and economic reform to support a FairShares Model of enterprise. FairShares 
brand principles change the way that investment activity is understood to ensure 
that capital is allocated for entrepreneurial, labour and user activities as well as 
financial contributions.  The result is wealth and power that is shared more fairly. 
 
At the start of 2014, I came across new studies that acted as a powerful reminder of the need for a FairShares 
Model.  In this article I will describe the most striking of these, then argue that the co-operative and social 
enterprise movements need to concern themselves with everyone in the ‘bottom’ 80% of the population, not 
just those in extreme poverty.  They also need to protect the wealth embedded in our natural environment. 
I recently came across a YouTube animation that portrays private wealth distribution in the US using data from 
a study at Harvard University1. This tells a completely different story to Shift Change2, a documentary about 
social economy in the US and Spain.  While the Harvard study reports that top US CEOs get 380 times the 
average worker’s pay, Shift Change reports that worker co-operatives either adopt equal pay systems or 
accept small wage differentials sanctioned by the worker-owners.  For example, the ratio between top and 
lowest paid workers in the Mondragon Co-ops – where there are 100,000 workers - averages just 5:13 4. 
The Harvard study claims that 90% of citizens are impoverished by private sector business practices.  The 
‘bottom’ 80% owns just 7% of total wealth, while the top 20% has 93%.  Only 10% gain, and the top 1% gain 
disproportionately.  There is no doubt.  Hayek’s theory that economic freedom leads to a ‘trickle down’ effect is 
untrue.  It produces a ‘trickle up’ effect instead5 6.  But Shift Change shows that where co-operative business 
models become dominant, wealth is spread more evenly and equitably.  Member-owned businesses more 
often than not, are as (commercially) successful as their private sector counterparts7 8.  That’s where the 
FairShares Model comes in – it stimulates change to support growth in the social economy. 
The Key Issue 
Most social enterprises focus on the poorest communities.  Whilst important, it is more urgent that we reform 
systems that exploit and impoverish up to 90% of working people (as well as the environment in which they 
live).  We need social enterprises for the bottom 90% (everyone impoverished) not just the bottom 10% (the 
most impoverished).  We also need a way to prevent the top 10% of earners acquiring hegemonic control over 
investment decisions.  If this task is beyond us, the goals of social enterprise will also be beyond us. 
It is not an accident that most people are getting poorer (in both absolute and relative terms).  Studies of 
company law make it clear than private enterprises are not designed to share power or wealth9.  Founders fix 
structures at incorporation to privilege a set of interests (i.e. entrepreneur(s) and financial investors in 
companies, consumers or workers in single stakeholder co-operatives). Charitable organisations are also 
inflexible: board and workforce members are subordinate to charitable/social objects set by the founders.   
Entrepreneurship research clarifies how enterprises start.  One or more founding members - by design or 
accident – find opportunities to develop new markets for products and services10. If viable, they organise 
resources to support a business and build socio-technical systems to maintain management control.  Growing 
enterprises, however, also depend on the goodwill of the workforce, customers (service users) and 
institutional investors to access the human, social and financial capital needed for sustainability11.   
The key issue is that while we have developed systems for recognising the contribution of financial capital, 
we do not have adequate arrangements for recognising contributions of intellectual, human, social and natural 
   Rory Ridley-Duff and FairShares Association, 2014, Creative Commons 4.0 
Published by the FairShares Association, 4 Rosehill Close, Penistone, Sheffield, S36 6UF 
capital.  To understand why, we have to review the way social norms for constituting joint-stock companies 
and non-share companies have developed. 
Private Sector (For-Profit) Norms – Companies Limited by Shares (CLS) 
There is a connection between business ideology and the arrangements in law by which entrepreneurs 
acquire share capital (ordinary shares).  They register as directors, then recruit employees to operationalize 
their ideas. New capital is issued when more financial capital is needed, but not when more intellectual, 
human, social or natural capital are needed.  In an unadapted CLS, employees and customers are 
subordinated to the interests of shareholders. They are not invited to be full members or to contribute towards 
decisions outside their specialist area of expertise12. If employees are offered share capital, voting rights are 
often limited or controlled by trustees who – in many cases – are under no legal obligation to vote in 
accordance with the wishes of their beneficiaries13. 
The intellectual property created by the workforce is acquired by the Company and controlled by executive 
managers and directors. In effect, majority shareholders treat intellectual, human, social and natural capital 
investments by others as if they were additional financial investments by themselves.  They continue to 
acquire rights to all the property created by the interactions between employees, customers and the natural 
environment.  This system of enterprise widens the wealth gap between those who own and govern the 
enterprise, and those who sell their labour to it, or buy goods from it.  Even in the richest countries, wealth 
inequalities grow wider (unless the state intervenes)14 and the natural environment is degraded15. 
Voluntary Sector (Non-Profit) Norms – Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLG) 
A typical response to the social problems created by privately owned economies is to create (private) charities 
and ‘non-profit’ companies using a Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG). This form of incorporation usually 
involves specifying charitable or social objects that define the purpose(s) of the enterprise. Founders reframe 
themselves as trustee-directors responsible for allocating resources in pursuit of social goals. 
Charitable CLGs do not issue share capital so trustee-directors give up personal rights to the surplus wealth 
created by the enterprise. Their role (in law) is one of stewardship, ensuring that funds raised are used to 
further charitable (or social) objectives defined in the Articles of Association. As in a CLS, they employ staff to 
pursue social goals. Employees are still not (usually) legal members.  They continue to be subordinate to the 
trustee-directors and give up the (intellectual) property they create. 
Social Economy Norms – The Co-operative Society / Mutual Company 
Do we have to choose between these two models? Three bodies of knowledge suggest we do not. Firstly, 
there is a global movement backed by the UN to increase responsible use of corporate assets16. Secondly, 
the UN’s International Year of Co-operatives highlighted the global growth of the social economy17. 
Particularly important is the way that the internet has reduced the costs associated with co-operative working.  
The upsides of co-operation (intellectual exchange and collaborative decision-making) no longer come with 
the downsides of democracy (hefty co-ordination costs)18. Lastly, more enterprises identify themselves as 
social, deploying business models that improve human well-being through innovative trading strategies19. 
Creating non-shareholding companies enables the wealthier sections of society to address some symptoms of 
poverty and exclusion that private enterprises create, but it cannot address the root causes because it 
changes neither the ownership structure nor governance processes that creates and sustains them. 
Traditional private / non-profit models continue to institutionalise a division between producers and consumers 
on the one hand, and entrepreneurs and (social) investors on the other. For this reason, Level 1 of the 
FairShares Model asks important questions about representation in ownership, governance and management. 
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As shown above, the FairShares Model is based on an approach to social economy defined by Social 
Enterprise Europe.  It operates from the assumption that the exclusion of primary stakeholders from member-
ownership (i.e. employees, producers, customers and service users) is a cause of contemporary poverty. At 
Level 2, the answer to each FairShares question suggests the set of corporate arrangements that is most 
favourable: entrepreneurs get Founder Shares; workforce members get Labour Shares; trading commitments 
are rewarded with User Shares; and financial capital creation is rewarded with Investor Shares.   
 
This represents a new approach to valuing investments.  When there are surpluses (profits), not only do the 
providers of financial capital get a return, but also the contributors of other types of capital.  In a 
FairShares Company, half the capital gain is issued to Labour and User Shareholders as new Investor 
Shares, while the other half increases the value of existing Investor Shares.  In a FairShares Co-operative, 
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surpluses can be allocated to restricted funds controlled by Labour and User member-owners, who then use 
their chosen approach to direct democracy to allocate surpluses to social investment projects. 
None of this means that the conventional mechanism for allocating shares to external financial investors has 
to stop.  In a FairShares Company / Co-operative, Investor Shares can be issued to external investors if debt 
finance is hard to secure.  But, even with this, at least 70% of the wealth accumulated will find its way 
into the hands (and bank balances) of producers and consumers.  It enriches the ‘bottom’ 90% as much 
as the ‘top’ 10%.  And if this is not sufficient, FairShares Articles of Association (at Level 3) includes 
community dividends that act as an asset lock for philanthropic capital if the enterprise is dissolved. 
The Articles of Association provided by the FairShares Association are not the only model rules that support 
FairShares brand principles20.  But they do represent an ambitious attempt to bring together the most enduring 
developments in multi-stakeholder ownership, governance and management so that we change the way 
investments are recognised and valued21 22.  The FairShares Model offers a system for ensuring that capital is 
allocated to different types of contribution so that wealth and power can be more fairly shared. 
Dr Rory Ridley-Duff is Reader in Co-operative and Social Enterprise at Sheffield Hallam University (www.shu.ac.uk/sbs), director of 
Social Enterprise Europe (www.socialenterpriseeurope.co.uk), and a co-founder of the FairShares Association (www.fairshares.coop).  
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